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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO A COURT-MARTIAL
PROCEEDING
MELVIN E. PEARL
This comment will consider the extent to which
a federal court, by the use of the writ of habeas
corpus, may upset decisions of military courts-
martial in cases involving members of the United
States Armed Forces.
It would seem logical that the Bill of Rights of
the United States Constitution would apply
equally to servicemen as well as civilians. This
premise, hoivever, cannot be summarily assumed.
The applicability of due process standards to a
court-martial proceeding has long been a subject
of misinterpretation and in light of recent cases
may disclose defects in the courts-martial system.
Courts-martial are independent tribunals created
by statute pursuant to the federal constitution.
They have complete power and jurisdiction to
determine judicially any cause involving offenses
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'
Judicial review by federal courts over the decisions
of military tribunals can only be exercised when
the military courts have exceeded the bounds of
the jurisdiction marked out for them by law. With-
in these bounds they may act freely, and the civil
courts will respect their action as final. But once
they overstep these bounds, jurisdiction is lost,
and the federal courts may intervene.
This power to intervene stems from the consti-
tution through the use of the writ of habeas
corpus.2 The purpose of the writ is to secure the
release, by judicial decree, of persons who are
illegally restrained. It is a writ of liberty and will
not issue for the purpose of correction of errors
in the proceedings of the court, for there a writ
of error may be granted. The writ of habeas corpus
is a collateral attack and will be granted only
'By the authority granted in the U.S. CONST. art.
I, §8, cl. 14, Congress has the power: "To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces .... " Pursuant to this power, Congress
has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64
STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§551-741 (1952).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 2. "The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." See: 28 U.S.'.A. §2241 (1959)
for statutory enactment of power to grant writ.
where a determination has been made that the
tribunal rendering the judgment was without
jurisdiction.3
Elements of Traditional Jnrisdiction
Jurisdiction can best be defined in its traditional
sense by an examination of early cases which have
acknowledged the power of the federal district
courts to act. In Dynes v. Hoover,4 the court re-
stricted the scope of a collateral attack of the
judgment of the military tribunal to cases in which
the court-martial is found not to have jurisdiction
over the subject matter or offense or in which it
fails to observe the procedural rules prescribed by
law for the conduct of the trial. A finding of no
jurisdiction has the effect of voiding the entire
proceedings and allows the civil courts to issue the
writ of habeas corpus.
There are three well defined jurisdictional cate-
gories which may always be attacked by the writ
of habeas corpus. The first, and probably the most
common, is the consideration of the status of the
person, i.e., whether the accused is within the
court-martial jurisdiction.5 The second considera-
tion is whether the offense charged is within the
jurisdiction of a court-martial; 6 the third con-
3 Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897). Im-
perfections in appointment of the officer acting as judge
advocate will not affect the jurisdiction of the court-
martial. The jurisdiction will be affected only when the
person accused of the offense charged is not within the
scope of the court-martial power.
4 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). In re Grimley, 137
U.S. 147 (1890), petitioner claimed his enlistment was
void because he was over-age, hence he was not subject
to jurisdiction of court-martial. See also Collins v. Mc-
Donald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922).
5 United States v. McIntyre, 4 F.2d 823 (9th Cir.
1925), (question of petitioner's ever having been in-
ducted); United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno, 167
F.2d 593 (2nd Cir. 1948), (considering whether a re-
servist was lawfully on active duty status); Hironimus
v. Durant, 168 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1948), (question of
whether an officer on terminal leave was subject to
trial.)6 Johnson v. Biddle, 12 F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1926),
(whether offense was committed in wartime); United
States v. Maney, 61 Fed. 140 (C.C. Minn. 1894)
(whether offense was triable only in state courts.)
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sideration is concerned with the legal competency
of the personnel making up the court-martial.
7
The rationale for limiting the scope of review
of the civil courts to jurisdictional questions stems
from matters of policy concerning the military
court-martial and is historical in nature. The disci-
pline necessary to maintain the efficiency of the
armed forces requires other and swifter modes of
trial than are furnished by civil courts. Pursuant
to the power conferred by the constitution,
Congress has declared the kind of trial and the
manner in which it should be conducted for of-
fenses committed while in the military. 8 It was
stated a century ago that a person who enters the
military surrenders his rights to be tried by the
civil courts and the rules and procedures which
guide them.9 Consequently, the power of Congress
in the governing of land and naval forces was not
to be affected by the specific trial guarantees of
the Bill of Rights.
The courts have been consistent in applying
this doctrine, particularly with respect to the fifth
and sixth amendments. In claims of denial of due
process and other violations of fifth and sixth
amendment rights, the civil courts have held that
such allegations of error, urged singly or collec-
tively, do not amount to a denial of a fair trial
so as to cause the court-martial to lose its jurisdic-
tion.10 It is to be remembered that the procedure
followed in military courts is sanctioned by law,
and must be viewed in the context of the military,
even though some of these procedures might not
7 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26(a), 64
Stat. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §590 (1952). The question
of the qualifications of the law officer goes to the juris-
diction of the tribunal. McClaughry v. Deming, 186
U.S. 49 (1902). See also: Uniform Code of Militaryjustice art. 27(a), (c), 64 Stat. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§591 (1952).
8 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 108
(1950), 50 U.S.C. §§551-741 (1952).
.Ex parle Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
10 Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
Petitioner was convicted by a general court-martial of
larceny. He set up numerous grounds for denial of due
process, e.g., illegality of arrest, violations of confiden-
tial relationship between attorney and client, miscon-
duct of trial judge, and the unlawful absence of an
assistant trial judge; but the court found the totality of
such errors did not constitute a denial of due process.
See also Ex pare Qirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942), where
the Court explained that § 2 of Article III of the con-
stitution provided that, "The Trial of all Crimes, except
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." And that
the intent of the framers of the constitution was not to
enlarge the common law right to trial by jury, but was
to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases
where it had been recognized by the common law. The
Court went on to say that the existence of the fifth
and sixth amendments did not enlarge this right.
be in harmony with the ideals for the administra-
tion of justice in a civil court. With this philosophy
in mind, the civil courts have repeatedly stated
that all that remains for determination in a habeas
corpus proceeding is the question of jurisdiction.1
Thus they impliedly state that any constitutional
deprivations will not merit a review through habeas
corpus.
Military Due Process
The military courts, however, have been able to
rationalize their actions by the obscure phrase
"military due process." Much has been written of
military due process, yet it still remains undefined.
It is not jurisdictional, nor is it constitutional due
process. It is not general prejudice, and it has not
once been mentioned by Congress in the Uniform
Code of Military justice. Speaking generally then,
it seems that a substantial violation of a provision
of the Uniform Code of Military justice resulting
in error which the Court of Military Appeals 12
finds materially prejudiced the rights of an accused,
would constitute a want of military due process.
Conversely, any military tribunal's action, within
its jurisdiction, supported by "some substantial
evidence" in which the court finds no error mate-
rially prejudicial to the rights of the accused, is
one complying with military due process." To face
the problem in more concrete terms, the Supreme
Court has said in Reaves v. Ainsworth:14
"[W]hat is due process of law must be de-
termined by circumstances. To those in the
military or naval service of the United
States the military law is due process. The
decision, therefore, of a military tribunal,
acting within the scope of its lawful powers,
cannot be ... set aside by the [civil] courts."
(Emphasis added.)
Civilian Use of Habeas Corpus
In contrast, it is clearly settled by statutory
mandate that a civilian who suffers an unconsti-
tutionally conducted trial in a civil court can get
11 Ex pare Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
12 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 108(1950), 50 U.S.C. §§551-741 (1952). Review of courts-
martial for errors of law.
13 Wurfel, .Military Due Process: What is It?, 6 VAmi.
L. REV. 251 (1952).
14 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911). Petitioner, an officer in
the United States Army, was retired with pay for life
after failing an examination. He claimed that his com-
mission constituted property of which he could not be
deprived without due process of law. See also; United
States ex rd., French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922).
[Vol. 50
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
relief through the writ of habeas corpus.'5 Histori-
cally, the scope of review for persons convicted in
civil courts has always been considerably wider
than that of military courts. In examining consti-
tutional violations, the federal courts have in-
quired deeply into the facts of the individual cases
to determine if the allegation was true and whether
it could be explained away in order to leave the
prior proceeding untouched. For example, the
Supreme Court acknowledged its jurisdiction and
granted habeas corpus after examining the facts
of a case which claimed denial of due process due
to mob domination of the trial.' 6 In light of this
wider scope of review, the Court granted habeas
corpus in another case because of the introduction
of perjured testimony which the Court said was
inconsistent with the demands of justice and was
in violation of due process of law.17 Such cases are
illustrative of the more liberal approach in the
treatment of cases originating in civil cases as op-
posed to cases coming from military courts.
The most important judicial determination of
federal courts' jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus
in civil cases came in Johnson v. Zerbst. The court
here noted that the scope of review in habeas
corpus proceedings has been constantly broadened
and desired to take the step breaking completely
from the concept of "traditional jurisdiction" and
entered the realm of constitutional defect. Review-
ing courts, in habeas corpus proceedings, have
often said that they will look beyond mere form
and inquire into the substance of the matter and
the practicalities of the situation. In this case, the
Court limited its discussion to the applicability of
the sixth amendment to an accused person (but
impliedly the whole Bill of Rights has been en-
compassed). The Court said the application of the
sixth amendment is mandatory, and thus an essen-
1528 U.S.C.A. §2241(c)(3) (1959): "The writ of
habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States ...."
16 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Petitioner
claimed his trial was a total sham because of mob pres-
sures constituting a complete denial of due process.
7 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). (Federal
Court reviewed state court's decision where petitioner
claimed a violation of due process due to admission of
perjured testimony.) For similar treatment, see Walker
v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) and Ex parle Neilsen,
131 U.S. 176 (1889).
18 304 U.S. 458 (1938). After petitioner's conviction
in a district court for possession of counterfeit money,
he petitioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging a denial of the sixth amenwnaent because he
had no lawyer, but respondent contended the right was
waived. The case was reversed.
tial jurisdictional prerequisite to a court's depriv-
ing a citizen of his life or liberty. It is important
to note that this was the first instance in which
the Supreme Court announced that a constitu-
tional deprivation goes to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, hence allowing habeas corpus as an
appropriate remedy. The court stated that the
sixth amendment, if not properly applied, stands
as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction. The
effect of the decision is that if any constitutional
requirements are not complied with, the court will
lose its jurisdiction to proceed. Any judgment of
conviction pronounced by a court without juris-
diction is void. 9
The precedent set by Johnson v. Zerbst has been
consistently applied throughout the federal system.
Courts have paid particular attention to the preser-
vation of constitutional rights, especially those
encompassed within the fifth and sixth amend-
ments.20 In 1950, in Smith v. United States,2" the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia re-
examined the scope of habeas corpus on the basis
of past Supreme Court cases and concluded that
habeas corpus was available to correct the with-
holding of any constitutional right which amounted
to a denial of a fair trial. This, in effect, is a total
application of Johnso= v. Zerbst.
In such environment, the civil courts have not
been completely inactive in keeping pace with
changing concepts of justice as applied to the mili-
tary field. For example, the protection against
double jeopardy afforded by the fifth amendment
has been recognized as applicable to courts-
martial." Civil courts will also entertain a writ of
habeas corpus in courts-martial cases to consider
the severity of the sentence as a possible violation
of the eighth amendment."1 Presumably it is a
19 Id. at 468.
20 Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945), held
that the use of the writ of habeas corpus extends to
those exceptional cases where a conviction has been
found in disregard of constitutional rights and where
the writ is the only effective means of preserving such
rights. Scott v. Aderhold, 116 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1940),
held that habeas corpus was the proper remedy where
petitioner was denied benefit of counsel in a criminal
case.
1 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950). At petitioner's
trial, a policeman who interrogated petitioner during
period of illegal detention, was allowed to testify; this
was the basis of a claim of denial of due process.
2' Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1940).
(Claim of double jeopardy was frivolous because jeop-
ardy had not yet attached, for President had not signed
order of first conviction.)
"Powers v. Hunter, 178 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1949).
Petitioner claimed that his sentence violated the pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment. After
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matter of natural justice that the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments be incorpo-
rated in all court-martial proceedings. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in acknowledging
the fact that they have jurisdiction to determine
such violations said:
"The sentence in each instance must be
commensurate with the crime, otherwise it
would violate the constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment."2 4
The years following World War II found the
federal courts subscribing to a more liberal ap-
proach where a denial of due process in a military
proceeding was claimed. The lower civil courts
were attempting to give a greater semblance of
fairness to the military proceeding by reducing the
disparity between the concept of military due
process and that of constitutional or fifth amend-
ment due process. For example, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, in dicta, defined the
status of a person in the armed forces:
"We think [the] basic guarantee of fair-
ness afforded by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment applies to a defendant in
criminal proceedings in a federal military
court as well as in a federal civil court. An in-
dividual does not cease to be a person within
the protection of the fifth amendment of the
Constitution because he has joined the...
armed forces and has taken the oath to sup-
port that Constitution with his life, if need
be."25
The court went on to say that these constitutional
guarantees do not require the same exactness in a
military court as in a civil court, but rather must
be applied in the context of military law or mili-
tary "due process." Nevertheless, the due process
clause guarantees to servicemen that military
court procedure will be applied to them in a funda-
mentally fair way.
The crest of liberality was reached in Shapiro v.
a careful review, the petition was dismissed. But cf.,
Ex parte Dickey, 204 Fed. 322 (D. Mo. 1913), where
the court said the severity of a sentence cannot be
reviewed by a writ of habeas corpus.
21 Powers v. Hunter, 178 F.2d 141, 145 (10th Cir.
1949).
25 Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666 (3rd Cir. 1944).
After a lengthy discussion of due process, the court
found that the points argued by petitioner lacked merit
and the petition was denied. See also Hayes v. Hunter,
83 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1948), where the court said
that total lack of evidence at the trial level is a suffi-
cient allegation to give civil courts jurisdiction to
grant writ of habeas corpus.
Unitel States.2 Borrowing heavily from the treat-
ment of habeas corpus given to cases originating
in civil courts, the court cited Johnson v. ZerbsF
and declared that jurisdiction may be lost in the
course of the trial due to constitutional depriva-
tions and that, "it would. . go without saying
that these amendments apply as well to military
tribunals as to civil ones. 2 8 This was an express
application, without reservation, of the fifth and
sixth amendments, and even went so far as to
equate military and civil courts, stating that in
both systems of justice a denial of defendant's
rights under the fifth and sixth amendments de-
prives the court of jurisdiction to proceed, and
any conviction rendered would be void.
The Supreme Court, in later cases, refused to
accept this theory and adhered to the idea that
the scope of review by a civil court of a court-
martial proceeding would not extend to constitu-
tional questions. 29 The Court pointed out, in dicta,
that review is only extended to cases where there
has been a gross abuse of discretion which would,
in effect, give rise to a defect in the jurisdiction
of the court-martial. This was the rationale of the
courts in refusing to hear subsequent cases alleging
the denial of due process in matters affecting such
things as sufficiency of evidence, adequacy of pre-
trial investigation, and competency of defense
counsel.30
Once more the traditional concept of "jurisdic-
tion," that is, a properly constituted court-martial
having jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter and having the power to impose a sentence,
became the critical test. And it appeared that the
civil courts, in reviewing a petition for habeas
corpus of a military prisoner, refused to take
judicial notice of the wide scope of review offered
26 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947). Petitioner in a suit
to recover salary alleged that the court-martial lostjurisdiction to render a verdict because of the unfair
treatment accorded him which amounted to a denial of
his rights under the fifth and sixth amendments.
2 See note 18 supra.
28 See note 26, supra, at 207.
21 See note 30 infra.
30 Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949). Peti-
tioner's allegation, as in Henry v. Hodges, 76 F. Supp.
968 (S.D. N.Y. 1948), was that the court-martial lost
its jurisdiction because of an impartial pre-trial in-
vestigation, i. e. the arresting officer was one appointed
to conduct pre-trial investigation. The Supreme Court
rejected this contention and stated that pre-trial inves-
tigation cannot properly be construed as an indispen-
sable requisite to the exercise of general court-martialjurisdiction, and therefore does not empower civil courts
in habeas corpus proceedings to invalidate court-martialjudgments.
[Vol. 50
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to a petitioner for habeas corpus originating from
a federal civil court.
Present Application of Habeas Corpus to Servicemen
The case of Burns v. lyilson: blazed a new trail
and broadened the scope of review of court-
martial cases through habeas corpus. Decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1953, it was
a case in which petitioners alleged that they were
subjected to illegal detention, that coerced confes-
sions were extorted from them, that they were
denied counsel of their choice, and that there were
gross abuses of due process.
The Court first considered its jurisdiction in
habeas corpus cases and stated that the statute
which grants jurisdiction over persons confined by
the military courts is the same statute which vests
the Court with jurisdiction over persons confined
by civil courts. The Court noted, however, that
in military habeas corpus proceedings the scope of
review had always been more narrow than in civil
cases. It is important to bear in mind that there
is an ever existing disparity between military and
federal law which prevails to preserve the over-
riding demands of discipline and duty in the mili-
tary. The court took notice of this and stated:
"Military law, like state law, is a jurispru-
dence which exists separate and apart from
the law which governs in our federal judicial
establishment.... [T]he rights of men in the
armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of disci-
pline and duty, and the civil courts are not
the agencies which must determine the precise
balance to be struck in this adjustment."-*
The Court recognized the importance of pro-
tecting the constitutional rights of a member of
the armed forces when considering the possibility
that the military reviewing court may refuse to
hear claims such as in petitioner's case:
".... For the constitutional guarantee of due
process is meaningful enough and sufficiently
3' 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Petitioner, a member of the
United States Air Force, was tried by court-martial
and was found guilty of murder and rape and sentenced
to death. Petitioner in his allegations claimed he was
denied due process and listed many alleged violations
such as being mistreated and subjected to continuous
questioning without being informed of his rights, the
planting of evidence against petitioner by the military
authorities, being detained without arraignment until
the court-martial convened, and many others. All of
these allegations were found to be w;thout merit. The
Supreme Court recognized this and denied the writ.
Id. at 140.
adaptable to protect soldiers ... as well as
civilians... from the crude injustices of a
trial so conducted that it becomes bent on
fixing guilt by dispensing with.rudimentary
fairness rather than finding truth through ad-
herence to those basic guarantees which long
have been recognized and honored by the
military as well as the civil courts."-3
It was noted that these rights may be modified
by the requirements of discipline, but they cannot
be completely ignored merely because a person is
in uniform. The court broke the bounds of the
traditional limit of jurisdiction and announced
that the test should be one of "fundamental fair-
ness." When it is established in the habeas corpus
proceeding that an appellate military court has
fully and fairly heard the charges of unfairness,
its decision is binding on civil courts. Conse-
quently, the civil courts would issue habeas corpus
omdy if it decided that the military reviewing court
failed to give the allegations full and fair considera-
tion.
After a careful examination of the record, the
Court said that the military court had carefully
scrutinized all allegations of the petitioner and
had found no due process violations. Therefore,
it is now the limited function of the civil courts to
determine only if the military courts have given
a full and fair consideration to each of the claims.
It is not the function of the civil courts merely to
reweigh the evidence. Consequently, in order to
maintain a successful application for a writ of
habeas corpus, it becomes necessary for petitioner
to show that the military review was legally in-
adequate to resolve the claims which are urged
upon the civil court.
The rationale of Justice Douglas' dissent was
that habeas corpus should be granted if the facts
showed the military court erred in applying the
standards of due process as formulated by the civil
courts. He helps describe this adherence to the
basic constitutional guarantees by noting that
judicial review of military courts-martial is no
longer limited to questions of jurisdiction in the
"traditional" sense. To amplify this, it is important
to analyize the fifth amendment.- The fifth amend-
"Id. at 142.
14 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No person shall be held
to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
19601
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ment expresses only one specific exception to its
general application, and that is for cases "arising
in land or naval forces" no indictment is needed
before trial. Applying the legal maxim-the ex-
press mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of all others, it seems irrational, in light of the
above, that the other provisions of the fifth
amendment (and of the Constitution) can mean
one thing in civil courts and another in military
courts. Therefore, a military court should be under
an obligation to apply the rules of due process as
formulated by the Supreme Court, and not those
formulated by a military tribunal.
On petition for rehearing, Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting, was quick to reject the stand that the
review of military cases through habeas corpus
has always been more narrow than that of civil
cases. He noted that throughout the years the re-
view available through habeas corpus has been
limited to questions of jurisdiction in both civil
and military cases. But in 1937 the Court decided
Johnson v. Zerbst and gave new content to the
term "jurisdiction" so as to encompass constitu-
tional deprivations. Whethor the holding of that
case is to be applied in the military sphere can
only be implied from the language of Justice
Frankfurter, but it appears that he is an advocate
of that view. He said:
"This court has never considered the appli-
cability of Johnson v. Zerbst to military
habeas corpus cases... [but] if a denial of
due process deprives a civil body of "juris-
diction", is not a military body equally with-
out "jurisdiction" when it makes such a
denial, whatever the requirements of due
process in the particular circumstances may
be."
35
A military reviewing court must give full and
fair consideration to questions relating to the
guarantees afforded an accused by the Constitu-
tion; and if and when this is done to the satisfac-
tion of the civil courts, the latter will not review
the case. This principle, as laid down by Burns v.
Wilson, has been strictly applied in subsequent
cases.3" The philosophy of the courts, in reviewing
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation."
11 Burns v. Wilson, supra, note at 848.
316 Dixon v. United States, 237 F.2d 509 (10th Cir.
1956); Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379 (10th Cir. 1956);
and Dickenson v. Davis, 143 F. Supp. 421 (D. Kans.
military cases, is that if the allegations of the
petitioner affect either jurisdiction or are of a con-
stitutional nature, the court will have jurisdiction
to issue the writ. However, the writ will issue only
after the decision that there was not a full and
adequate review by the military courts. The scope
of review has been expanded and emphasis has
been shifted from mere "jurisdiction" to broader
considerations of the fullness and fundamental
fairness of the totality of the court-martial pro-
ceedings in compliance with the ConstitutionY
Since 1953, the various circuits have not been
unanimous in their interpretation of the Burns
case. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has apparently struck out on its own in its inter-
pretation of Burns and bases its decisions on the
phrase "a fundamentally fair trial." 38 Rather than
look to the record of the military appellate court,
this court has considered the procedures of the
trial court and their adherence to the federal
Constitution. The court stated:
".... if the court-[martial] were shown to have
fixed 'guilt by dispensing with rudimentary
fairness rather than finding truth through ad-
herence to those basic guarantees which have
long been recognized and honored by the
military courts as well as the civil courts', it
would be open to the federal civil courts to
grant the writ sought.... Our own careful
examination of the record does not reveal
that appellant's trial was in violation of that
rule." 39 (emphasis added).
The theory that the federal court should examine
1956). Cases concerning themselves with the concept of
fullness and fairness of the review by the military re-
viewing court. The cases are in full accord with Burns
v. Wilson.
n In Young v. Brucker, No. 2567 H.C. (D. Kans.
1958) the court followed the test laid down by the
Burns case, but in an interesting portion of dicta said
that if a civil court, in examining the record, should
find an absence of any evidence to support the conclu-
sion, it is a matter of law that the military court had
not given full and fair consideration to petitioner's
claim. See also Thomas v. Davis, 249 F.2d 232 (10th
Cir. 1957); Bouchier v. Van Metre, 223 F.2d 646 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); De Coster v. Madigan, 223 F.2d 906 (7th
Cir. 1955).
' White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503 (3rd Cir. 1954).
Petitioner claims he was denied constitutional and
military due process because in his trial there was no
instruction by the law member in open court to the
members of the court-martial defining the crime of
voluntary manslaughter and its elements, and self
defense as related to the defendant. The court decided
the record was not sufficient to establish that defend-
ant's trial lacked due process, and petition was denied.Id. at 507.
[Vol. 50
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the record of the military trial court to find con-
stitutional deprivations was espoused by the dis-
senting justices in the Burns case. However, this
is not the law as set down by that case.
Conclusion
Currently, the law defining scope of review
available to a convicted serviceman in the civil
courts is well formulated. The doctrine as recited
in Burns v. Wilson is that a civil court cannot
grant a petition for habeas corpus if the military
tribunals have fully and fairly considered the
allegations of the petitioner. An analysis of Burns,
however, shows that this case actually accom-
plished little .in giving a military prisoner any
added protection against infringements of his
civil liberties. This can be best illustrated by an
example of the gross abuse of due process and a
showing of the ineffective relief a defendant would
get from a federal district court under the present
interpretation of the Burns case.
Hypothetically, a soldier is on trial for a crime,
and in the course of the trial the prosecution of-
fers various witnesses who present very damaging
testimony. At no time is counsel for the defense
allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, and con-
sequently the defendant is convicted. The de-
fendant then appeals to the Court of Military
Appeals alleging denial of due process because of
the lack of the opportunity to cross-examine.
After careful consideration, the appellate court
decides that no injustice had been committed and
justifies the actions of the trial court as a part of
military due process. The defendant then petitions
the federal district court for a writ of habeas
corpus again alleging a denial of due process. We
now come to the unfortunate situation resulting
from the Burns decision. The hands of the federal
court are tied. The Court of Military Appeals has
given the case a full and fair hearing, and there-
fore the federal court cannot interfere, because as
it is argued, military law "is a jurisprudence which
exists separate and apart from the law which
governs in our federal judicial establishment" and
therefore the decision must stand.
This argument is untenable. The desire to pre-
serve military law with its overriding demands of
discipline and duty should in no way affect court
room procedures or abridge the rights of any
serviceman accused of a crime. Once the accused
enters the court room he should be afforded the
same protections as any civilian in a similar situa-
tion. The constitutional protections inherent in
our citizenship will in no way alter or amend the
application of military law as prescribed in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is anomalous
that one who enters the armed forces is perform-
ing his greatest role as a citizen and yet is reduced
to a status where he no longer can enjoy the rights
which protect his civilian counterpart. 4
40 Of the members of the Supreme Court who joined
in the majority opinion in Burns v. Wilson, only Mr.
Justice Clark is still on the Court. However, all three
dissenting justices are still present. One may speculate
as to the result of another Burns type case if presented
to the Supreme Court today. This writer believes the
view of the dissenters would prevail.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Failure To Deny Incriminatory Statements
Made by Co-conspirator Is Admissible in Evi-
dence Against Silent Defendant-Petitioner, a
Negro, was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. A confession made by peti-
tioner was excluded at the trial as involuntary,
since it was obtained after a law enforcement
officer informed the defendant that a large group
of white people was looking for him. After de-
fendant had been incarcerated, his co-conspirators
confessed the crime and implicated the defendant
by statements made in his presence. Petitioner re-
fused to affirm or deny the accusations levelled
against him. Upon -appeal the Supreme Court of
Arkansas held that petitioner's failure to deny the
accusations made by his co-conspirators was ad-
missible in evidence against him as an admission,
since their statements were made in his presence
while he was in custody and thus secure from
possible mob violence. Boyd v. State, 328 S.W.2d
122, (Ark. 1959).
In Comuonwealtk v. Machado, 162 N.E.2d 71
(Mass. 1959) a similar result was reached. Peti-
tioner was convicted of incest with his 16 year
old step-daughter. The stepdaughter gave the
police a detailed, signed statement accusing the
defendant of having intercourse with her on
several occasions. At the trial, a police officer was
permitted to testify that when he showed the
defendant the child's signed statement and asked
him what he had to say about it defendant replied
"that he neither admitted it nor denied it." Upon
appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts affirmed, holding that the officer's testimony
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
was properly admitted since "it is the well settled
law of this Commonwealth that where an accused
responds to incriminating accusations made of him
in an equivocal, evasive, or irresponsive way in-
consistent with his innocence, both the accusations
and his answer are admissible." Petitioners's
contention that he was within his constitutional
rights in refusing to answer and that the use of
such a refusal against him made a mockery of his
privilege against self-incrimination was dismissed
without discussion.
In Moreland v. United States, 270 F.2d 887
(10th Cir. 1959), the petitioner was convicted of
robbing and stealing money and property of the
United States from the man lawfully in charge of a
postal contract station. Admitted into evidence
over his objection were statements made to police
officers while they were taking him back to jail
after his arraignment. These statements consisted
mainly of inquiries as to whether he could make
some sort of deal with the authorities and as to
the possibility of receiving a light sentence in
return. The Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
viction, holding that the statements were ad-
missible as an implied admission of guilt since it
seemed "quite clear that they were not induced by
threats, promises, or coercion of any character and
were freely and voluntarily made."
Failure To Grant Opportunity To Speak in
Mitigation of Sentence Constitutes Reversible
Error-Petitioner was convicted of assault in a
bench trial before the Municipal Court for the
District of Columbia. The trial judge imposed the
maximum sentence authorized by law without
giving petitioner an opportunity to present any
information in mitigation of punishment. Prior to
sentencing, the trial judge asked for the previous
record of the petitioner, and after examining docu-
ments presented by the prosecution, the judge
made the following remarks:
"The Court: Well, you haven't got any record
that could be cited against you as you sat on the
stand, but you've been arrested for investigation
three times; you forfeited for drinking in a public
place; you forfeited for disorderly conduct on the
street four different times, and you have been
charged twice and acquitted twice for robbery; is
that right?
"The Defendant: Yes, sir.
"The Court: I'm afraid the string for you has
run out. In this case you are going to have to
serve one year's straight time and you are going
to have to pay a fine of five hundred dollars or
serve another year. Step him back."
The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the conviction but remanded
the cause for re-sentencing, holding that the
sentencing procedure contained in Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 32 a., was mandatory and not per-
missive, and that defendant therefore must have
an opportunity to speak in mitigation. Hensley v.
United States, 155 A.2d 77 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C.
1959).
Statutes Implementing Constitutional Right to
Speedy Trial Are Interpreted-Petitioner was
indicted for the murder of his wife and another
man while the three of them were drinking. After
several mistrials, he was convicted of manslaughter
in the first degree for the killing of the other man
and was sentenced to eight years in the state
penitentiary. Two years later he moved for dis-
missal of an indictment charging him with the
murder of his wife. He based his claim upon a
state statute which provided for the dismissal of a
prosecution against one accused of a public
offense where the accused is not brought to trial
at the next term of court in which the offense is
triable. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Okla-
homa dismissed the indictment, holding that no
good cause for the delay in trying the indictment
had been shown. Jordan v. Phillips, 344 P.2d 600
(Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
A similar statute providing for dismissal with
prejudice of a warrant, indictment or information
followed by 180 days of inexcusable delay in
prosecution was considered in People v. Hender-
shot, 98 N.W.2d 568 (Mich. 1959). The petitioner
was charged by warrant with unlawfully carrying
a concealed weapon. After seven months, peti-
tioner filed a writ of habeas corpus requesting
that the warrant be dismissed. The Supreme
Court of Michigan dismissed the writ, holding
that the prosecution had in good faith attempted
to ready the cause for trial, but that defendant's
delaying motions had caused the matter to extend
beyond the 180 day period. Such dilatory tactics
by the defendant rendered the delay excusable.
Indictment for Murder Ten Years After Unsuc-
cessful Court-Martial for Same Offense Denies
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